A DEVELOPMENT MODEL FOR FOREIGN POLICE

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This study investigates how the U.S. should conduct future police assistance programs. Security Sector Reform (SSR) identifies several principles that should guide police development. Studies have identified key lessons from SSR programs that have been implemented around the world. While SSR principles and key lessons have been identified, few models have been developed to guide the development of foreign police organizations. Using a qualitative research methodology, this study constructs such a model based on SSR principles and informed by key lessons learned from other SSR programs. The study then validates the model by applying it to a hypothetical future effort in Mali and comparing its results against those that would likely be achieved by the current U.S. police training program. This process determined that the model is valid and that in the case of Mali, the U.S. should adjust its police development programs to a more holistic program aimed at institutional development rather than focusing on simple train and equip programs to build anti-terrorism capabilities. This study is significant because it provides a framework that can be used to guide the U.S. in future police development efforts and can also be applied as the U.S. resumes assistance to Malian police.

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ABSTRACT

A DEVELOPMENT MODEL FOR FOREIGN POLICE, by Jay Fite, 107 pages.

This study investigates how the U.S. should conduct future police assistance programs. Security Sector Reform (SSR) identifies several principles that should guide police development. Studies have identified key lessons from SSR programs that have been implemented around the world. While SSR principles and key lessons have been identified, few models have been developed to guide the development of foreign police organizations. Using a qualitative research methodology, this study constructs such a model based on SSR principles and informed by key lessons learned from other SSR programs. The study then validates the model by applying it to a hypothetical future effort in Mali and comparing its results against those that would likely be achieved by the current U.S. police training program. This process determined that the model is valid and that in the case of Mali, the U.S. should adjust its police development programs to a more holistic program aimed at institutional development rather than focusing on simple train and equip programs to build anti-terrorism capabilities. This study is significant because it provides a framework that can be used to guide the U.S. in future police development efforts and can also be applied as the U.S. resumes assistance to Malian police.

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ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
ASSN	African Security Sector Network
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
CNRDRE	National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the Rule of Law
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CT	Bureau for Counter Terrorism
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DS	Bureau for Diplomatic Security
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EULEX	Europen Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GSRDC	Governance and Social Development Resource Center
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development--Development Assistance Committee
OPS	Office of Public Safety
PNTL	Policia Nacional Timor Leste
PRIME	Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluators
PSI	Pan Sahel Initiative
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SNP	Syndicat de Police Nationale
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIP	U.S. Institute for Peace

ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the Vietnam War, Congress significantly restricted U.S. foreign police

training programs, which effectively put an end to U.S. efforts to develop foreign police

organizations (Marenin 1986). However, since that time, the U.S. has increasingly found

itself in situations where developing and training foreign police became an important part

of post conflict stabilization efforts. Additionally, as part of its strategy to counter

terrorism, the U.S. has begun programs aimed at helping partner nations develop their

military and police forces to help them fight indigineous terrorist groups. The time and

monetary expenditure on these programs has grown significantly to assist countries

throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America (Perito 2011). However, these

programs have yielded mixed results. In some cases, the programs encountered problems

because of local politics within the partner country. In others, the programs did not focus

on the most important needs of the police organizations they were meant to help (Hills

2000).

This paper examines the field of foreign police development; both the academic

studies done within the field as well as lessons learned from actual police development

programs. This paper combines the key points from police development theory and

lessons learned to construct a foreign police development model that can be used as a

guide when desiging and implementing foreign police development programs. The

overall purpose of the model is to serve as a tool that can help build better police

development programs and better utilize U.S. time and resources in future programs. This

model is meant to be used at an intermediate level, or what the military would call the

"operational" level. It is not so detailed to describe how to conduct specific training or development actions. Rather, it describes how a foreign police development program should be focused. It guides program designers in determining whether a program should focus on building the police as an institution, or if a program should focus on training or equipping a police organization. It also serves to guide what type of institutional development, equipping, or training actions could best help a foreign police organization.

<div align="center">U.S. Foreign Police Training Programs</div>

The U.S. Government conducts a myriad of programs providing training for foreign police departments. Over time, America's foreign police training programs built police forces in its overseas territories; assisted allied countries in their struggles against communism; trained and equipped police in countries emerging from conflict; and most recently aided countries countering terrorist groups within their borders. Diplomatically, these programs advance U.S. interests by improving the capabilities of foreign police departments to counter international threats, enhancing bilateral relationships, and improving human rights in partner countries (U.S. Department of State 2005).

Across the federal government, the Departments of State (DoS), Defense (DoD), Justice (DoJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Energy (DoE), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) conduct the majority of America's foreign police training programs. While different programs focus on countering specific threats, most commonly they provide assistance dealing with counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, anti-crime, as well as other police activities as specified by Congress. The DoS conducts its foreign police training programs through the Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Counter Terrorism (CT), and Diplomatic Security (DS).

Several of these programs focus specifically on a multinational region or a single country, and emphasize different capabilities such as reducing transnational and organized crime, counter narcotics, and institution building. Two of the more prominent programs are INL's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, which is run in cooperation between DS and CT. ILEA trains mid-level police leaders at five different regional academies around the world. With the goal of building competence and cooperation on regional law enforcement issues, ILEA trains approximately 4,000 students each year throughout Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 2013b). ATA provides training and equipment to partner nations in an effort to build their capabilities to counter terrorist groups and activities. ATA courses focus primarily on helping partner nations respond to and resolve terrorist incidents and protect their national borders, critical infrastructure, and national leadership. First authorized by Congress in 1983, ATA has provided training to over 84,000 foreign law enforcement officers from 154 countries (U.S. Department of State 2013).

The DoJ conducts several different police development programs through its various agencies and offices. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducts training programs that assist local police in countering transnational crime and trains international law enforcement officers at its National Academy in Quantico, VA (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conducts training to assist select countries in countering narcotics trafficking. The DoJ also runs the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (Keller 2010). This program assists countries in addressing their specific law enforcement needs.

Unlike the majority of U.S. Government police assistance programs that focus on developing specific or advanced capabilities, ICITAP can provide basic, foundational training in core police functions and institutional development to help build a police force from the ground up. If appropriate, ICITAP also has the capability to provide advanced training in more specialized skills such as computer forensics, special investigations, and tactical skills (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 2013).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have substantially increased DoD's police development programs. Because of the enormity of the task required to rebuild the police systems in both countries, DoD was forced to take a more active role in training and equipping foreign police than it has historically done (Perito 2010). In some instances it provided direct training and equipment assistance to Iraqi and Afghani police. In other instances, DoD provided funding to DoS INL to run police training programs (Keller 2010). In addition to supporting Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD has provided equipment and counterinsurgency training in Pakistan, counter narcotics training to Mexico, and specialized security training to police in Colombia (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012).

Completing the list of federal government actors in foreign police training, DHS, DoE, and USAID also execute programs that train foreign law enforcement officials. DoE provides training and equipment to foreign border security officers to help detect radiation in an effort to prevent nuclear proliferation (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). USAID provides community based policing programs that aim to improve a police department's accountability to and relations with local communities (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011). These programs fall within USAID's work

with local justice institutions as it seeks to improve rule of law and human rights (Keller 2010). Lastly, the majority of DHS programs help host countries improve their border control capabilities through training and equipping border and customs officials (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012).

Between 2009-2011, these agencies provided an estimated $13.9B in funding for foreign police training, with DoS and DoD contributing nearly 97 percent of the total (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico and the Palestinian Territories received the largest amounts of funding during this period. In 2011, countries in South Central Asia received $3.69B, nearly doubling the $1.85B budgeted for the region in 2009. Funding for African countries doubled from $30M in 2009 to $63M in 2011. Funding for other regions decreased with the exception of East Asia and the Pacific, which received $29M in 2009, and $45M in 2011 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). Figures available for ATA show that nearly $1.4B was budgeted worldwide from FY2002 through FY2010 (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism 2012).

The U.S. has many different agencies that provide training and assistance to foreign police departments. Each organization is responsible for programs that have specific, limited objectives. With each agency pursuing its own objectives in the realm of foreign police training, it is difficult to ensure that the U.S. is taking a holistic approach to its police training programs in particular country. Downie and Cooke assert that, "U.S. efforts have remained disjointed, underfunded, lacking in strategic focus, and often dismissed as either too politically sensitive and complicated or as 'important but too difficult'" (Downie and Cooke 2011, 3). Perito and Bayley go so far as to recommend an

organizational change in the U.S. government to create a single entity that take the larger holistic view (Bayley and Perito 2010). While the federal government has coordination mechanisms in place, GAO reports have cited the need for improved coordination and program assessments to obtain better results (Government Accountability Office 2012). These assertions imply that the U.S. should improve the way in which it provides police assistance.

Research Question

Until 2012, the U.S. spent years and millions of dollars in its development and assistance programs for Mali (Pincus 2012). The Malian police, in particular, received millions of dollars worth of training in advanced police techniques from the U.S. However, the Malian police could not provide a basic level of policing to protect the population, nor to prevent the country from suffering a coup d'etat or having a significant amount of its territory fall into the control of terrorist groups. Many people question the effectiveness of previous U.S. assistance programs and the future complexion of U.S. aid to Mali. In commenting on the U.S. military's training for the Malian army, the former commanding general of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, stated, "We were focusing our training almost exclusively on tactical or technical matters. We didn't spend probably the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and military ethos" (BBC 2012).

One can draw similarities to the training for Mali's National Police with this quotation. The ATA training the Malian police received focused specifically on anti-terrorism measures and special capabilities in order to help the Malian government counter terrorist groups within Mali. However, this training did little to develop the basic police capacity to ensure security and enforce the rule of law, capabilities the Malian

National Police lacked. These capabilities are also important to countering terrorism within a country. By providing a basic level of security and law enforcement, local police can gain the public's trust and better gain the law enforcement intelligence needed to disrupt terrorist cells. Therefore, it is arguably just as important to develop a basic level of police capability in foreign countries that face a terrorist threat.

As the U.S. revives its aid programs to the Malian Government following the presidential elections in August 2013, it has an opportunity to re-evaluate the complexion of its support for the Malian police. What approach should the U.S. take toward training the Malian police? What knowledge can the U.S. gain from the academic study of foreign police development programs? What lessons have been learned from real-world police development programs? How can the U.S. use this information to better train foreign police?

Scope and Limitations

This paper examines the theory of foreign police development and the lessons learned from actual police development programs. It then weighs this against the U.S. Government's development program for the Malian police. Due to release restrictions on U.S. Government-held information, it relies only on sources available in the public domain. Additionally, this paper focuses on recent police development activities following the Cold War, as these instances are more applicable to building a current police development model.

Many sources studying foreign police development focus directly on, or at least mention, the work that has been done by the international community in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these cases provide a substantial amount of information to study and

analyze, this study excludes these cases as a primary focus. Although important, the environments in Iraq and Afghanistan are significantly different from the majority of countries requiring police development assistance.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

<u>Security Sector Reform</u>

The study of police development and training falls within the larger field of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Within this realm, there is no commonly agreed upon definition of SSR due to the myriad of organizations that influence or play an active role in SSR and the breadth of the field itself (United Nations 2013). However, several organizations have emerged as leaders in the field, and their definitions and ideals align regarding the overall field of SSR. The UN defines SSR as, "A process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, and that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations 2013).

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) is another leading organization in developing the common framework and conceptual foundations scholars and practitioners rely upon. The OECD-DAC describes itself as "a unique forum where governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalization. . . . The organization provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies" (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005, 2). Consisting of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, the OECD can reasonably fulfill this leadership role as its membership is composed of countries that typically act as significant donors in international development. The OECD defines SSR as, "another term used to describe the transformation of the 'security system'–which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions–working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework" (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2005). Most countries heavily base their SSR policies on the work done by the UN and OECD. Therefore, the contributions of the UN and OECD in SSR research have spread throughout the international community (Arnusch and Meharg 2010).

A paper jointly published by USAID, DoS, and DoD, defines SSR as, "the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public" (U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense 2009). American SSR efforts are premised on the desire to support peace, security, and good governance and support U.S. foreign policy objectives (Arnusch and Meharg 2010; U.S. Agency for International Development 2011).

In addition to the UN and OECD, several other organizations made significant contributions to the study of SSR. The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) provides a forum for experts and organizations focusing in SSR to work toward democratic SSR throughout Africa. Other key research in SSR has come from The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). GFN-SSR has combined its resources with the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), which is a partnership of research institutions and other organizations with expertise in development issues. Other key organizations for SSR research include the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), and the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

SSR is a relatively new field that has emerged after the end of the Cold War (Arnusch and Meharg 2010). It focuses on creating a secure environment in which economic development and good governance can take place. SSR addresses the security factors enabling development to take hold and eventually create governmental stability (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2005; U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense 2009). SSR includes many different aspects of security with the military and police being the primary factors. However, SSR also includes other aspects that interact with those two entities in order to provide security. This includes civilian oversight organizations for a country's military, police, judicial, and penal systems. It also includes civil society actors as well as private security providers (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011).

The commonly accepted premise behind SSR is that national sovereignty requires a basic level of security to assert the nation's legitimacy and to provide for economic

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advancement (Arnusch and Meharg 2010; Bouchat 2010). Typically a country's police are the most visible indicator of the government's authority and presence (Marenin 1982). Furthermore, people need to trust that the police will enforce rule of law without bias (Tait et al. 2010). A strong government, with a functioning police force that objectively enforces the local laws, sets the conditions for economic development and advancement (Arnusch and Meharg 2010). However, this also relies on the performance of other facets of a nation's security sector. For example, if a police force is performing its duties, conducting investigations, and arresting criminal suspects, there must also be an adequate legal framework, court system, and penal system to properly manage a criminal case. A weakness in any segment of the process can cause crime to continue and interfere with economic development (Bayley 2001). SSR is a critical step for weak or failing states, or for states that are emerging from conflict and must have economic development to support the population and help stabilize the government (Arnusch and Meharg 2010).

The organizations previously mentioned focused much of their studies on the higher-level concepts underlying the need for SSR and how to approach it in a general sense. They have not gone into detail concerning the specific requirements for capacity development and training for police organizations. Studies have only recently begun to focus on the more practical aspects of program implementation due to the increase in number of SSR programs undertaken throughout the world (Arnusch and Meharg, 2010).

<u>Key SSR Principles</u>

As stated earlier in this paper, there is no single, commonly accepted definition of SSR (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform 2007). While definitions

amongst various countries and international organizations differ somewhat, they are still quite similar. More importantly, these organizations generally agree on fundamental concepts underlying SSR.

The United Nations has identified ten principles that underpin its SSR efforts. In short, these are: an emphasis on security institutions that are effective, accountable, and promote human rights; undertaken only with appropriate authorization; national ownership and commitment; flexible and tailorable to local conditions; gender sensitive and address sexual and gender based violence; an essential part of post conflict activities; clearly defined strategy and goals; international support; and continuous coordination and support (United Nations Security Council 2008). Furthermore, the UN has recognized that SSR is not limited to post-conflict situations, but is also a factor in situations where countries are progressing toward democratization (United Nations 2013).

The OECD-DAC condenses many of the UN's SSR principles into five areas. These are:

> 1. The core values for SSR are to be people-centered, locally-owned and based on democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and on the rule of law. They should seek to contribute to an environment characterized by freedom from fear.
>
> 2. SSR should be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing populations and states through more integrated development and security system reform policies.
>
> 3. Donor governments should provide their assistance within strategic frameworks that are multi-sectoral. They must be developed jointly with partner governments and civil society and based on an assessment of the security needs of the people and the state. Women's organizations, in particular, can play a major role in ensuring that needs assessments capture the security concerns of vulnerable groups. This should involve broad consultation among donor government departments as well as close co-ordination with other donor governments and international organizations.

4. The security system should be managed according to the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector, in particular through greater civil oversight of security processes.

5. As far as possible, SSR processes should address the three core requirements of a well-functioning security system. (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee 2005, 22-23)

The OECD-DAC continues by describing what it deems to be the three core requirements for a security system. These include developing a nationally owned security policy, strengthening the governance of security institutions, and improving institutional mechanisms to implement reforms and the capacity to sustain them (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee 2005).

The U.S. Government, in a document jointly published by USAID, DoS, and DoD identifies five key principles guiding its SSR efforts. First, the U.S. recognizes that each effort will vary based on local culture, history, and politics. Because of this, the U.S. recognizes the importance of host nation ownership of any SSR program. The U.S. identifies the need for transparency, accountability, human rights, and legitimacy as driving factors in security force development. The next SSR principle for the U.S. is that sustainability and institutional support must be incorporated with operational support. Short-term programs that provide equipment or specialized capabilities must be balanced with organizational development to ensure that the receiving nation can sustain the additional equipment and skill sets. Next, the U.S. believes that all security forces should operate within the law and promote rule of law in conjunction with other elements of the security system such as the judicial sector. The U.S. highlights the need for transparency, not just on the part of the host nation's security sector, but also on the part of donor nations and those managing SSR programs. This helps to foster trust in the relationship

between donor and host countries. Lastly, the U.S. emphasizes that assistance in complex situations can have unintended consequences, and that SSR program leaders should incorporate risk management practices to avoid adverse affects resulting from assistance actions (U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense 2009).

History of SSR

Over time, very little has been written about developing foreign police capacity. A likely area for research would be to examine how colonial powers built, trained, and established the police departments within their colonies. However, very little was documented, in large part because colonial governments did not put much effort into developing police organizations until immediately before granting the colony its independence (Marenin 1982). Until that timeframe, colonial governments were more inclined to do what was required to maintain control and they were not concerned about implementing democratic policing practices or true, unbiased enforcement of rule of law (Hills 2000).

As time progressed from the colonial period into the Cold War, SSR was still neglected as a field of endeavor. During this period, donor countries focused their SSR efforts on military assistance to countries fighting against the spread of communism (Marenin 1986). At that time, policing was seen as less important than helping a foreign military enhance its capability to defeat a communist threat along its borders or from an internal insurgency. Any training that was done for police forces focused mostly on anti-communist ideology rather than enhancing police capabilities (Wulf 2004).

Following the Cold War, SSR began to emerge as an important requirement for development. Weak states emerging from decades of communist rule in Eastern Europe as well as other countries emerging from conflict and civil war in this timeframe showed the need for a larger view to solving development problems (Perito 2011). One of the key issues identified in multiple nation-building situations was the need to establish a basic level of safety and security in order for development projects to gain traction. This led to the larger examination of SSR, and the factors and processes that could provide a basic level of security (Marenin 1986). As SSR came under study, the international community began to understand the significant role played by a country's police force. Studies identified that police forces lacking in equipment, training, adequate leadership, and political independence were unable to achieve the needed security to set the conditions for economic development (Organization for Economic Co-Operation 2005).

While the UN and the rest of the international community evolved in their understanding of SSR, each country had different experiences supporting SSR programs. America's experiences in training foreign police forces are different from those of other donor countries for several reasons (Berg 2011). Unlike many other countries, America does not have a national police force. Whereas other countries that decide to undertake a foreign police training mission can draw on personnel from their national police force, America does not have that option because of its decentralized police organizations. Since America's police departments are funded, trained, and controlled by state and local municipalities, the federal government cannot order a large deployment of civilian police. America must often rely on former or retired police officers to provide training on a

contract basis (Jayamaha et al. 2010). This has affected how America delivers training for foreign police departments when compared to other countries (Berg 2011).

During the 1960s and 1970s, USAID provided training to police departments in Southeast Asia and Latin America through the Office of Public Safety (OPS). This training worked on a basic community policing model designed to build police capacity and to earn the trust of local populations in an effort to fight the communist insurgencies at the time (Arnusch and Meharg 2010). However, this program was stopped in 1973 due to abuses committed by police officers who had received American training under the program (Downie and Cooke 2011). Congress went so far as to insert Section 660 into the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974 that prohibited the U.S. from training foreign police (Keller, 2010). This effectively ended any kind of U.S. police training programs until approximately 1987, when it began providing training and equipment to foreign countries in order to fight terrorism (Marenin 1986). Since then, the U.S. has implemented other programs administered by the DoS, the DoJ, and USAID, all of which had the same goal of combatting terrorism (Keller 2010). America's most significant recent involvement with SSR has been in Iraq and Afghanistan as it worked to rebuild those police forces.

<center>Police Development Frameworks</center>

Several different frameworks or styles of policing emerged over time as police organizations evolved. An organization's policing style is dependent on several factors. Among these are the level of development of the country, its culture, the level of training and equipment available to department, its outlook on its duties, and relationship with the general public.

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The political style of policing was the first to emerge as police departments developed into the organizations they are today. Generally, police operating under this style are more responsive to the orders of their political masters who use the police to retain power. The individual officer's outlook is not necessarily to protect the public or enforce rule of law, but rather to enforce the interests of the powerful. This style is characterized by lack of basic competence, corruption, and lack of public trust (Hills 2007; US Agency for International Development 2011).

The professional style of policing emerged as a response to the corruption of the political style. Centralization of authority and reduced contact with the local population characterize this style. In an effort to eliminate corruption, individual officers were held to standards that were published policies. Strict command and control structures emerged, with decision-making reserved for senior officers. This generally improved policing at the cost of building barriers between the police and the general public (Kelling and Moore 1988; U.S. Agency for International Development 2011).

Where professional policing sought to instill standards and ensure that police response to calls for assistance were properly resolved, democratic policing takes those principles one step further. Democratic policing ensures that police actions are subject to rule of law, limited by law in its interactions with the public, and publicly accountable. These conditions are inherent in any true democracy. A key aspect of democratic policing is the control over use of force to specific circumstances defined by law with a system for public redress (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2008).

Community policing has become common over the past decade as a way to improve upon professional and democratic policing styles. Community policing

embodies characteristics of each, but differs in that it specifically seeks closer ties with the community. This helps police to know the public's concerns and ideally leads to greater information sharing with the public so that the police can prevent crime by acting proactively and pre-empting crime rather than being reactive and responding after a crime has occurred (Groenewald and Peake 2004).

Paramilitary policing emerged in recent years due to the number of countries required to rebuild their police forces while concurrently fighting an active insurgency. Paramilitary police are organized and trained similarly to the nation's military forces. Their tactics emphasize counter terrorism measures and investigations. They are typically more heavily armed that an average "beat cop" and focus more on dealing with significant issues of civil unrest rather than typical crime (Bayley and Perito 2010).

In *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime*, the authors have identified core functions that a police force must be able to perform, regardless of the style of policing they employ. Police must be available and responsive to calls for assistance from the community. They must focus on actually being helpful and solving the community's problems. Lastly, police must be fair and respectful; they must view the public as clients to serve rather than people to repress (Bayley and Perito 2010).

The style of policing that a country implements affects the training its police receive and their general capability levels. When evaluating or assessing a police organization for development programs, this helps determine what training the individual police officers should receive as well as the type of institutional developments needed. The *USAID Field Guide: Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement in Developing*

Countries identifies several assessment factors and possible training curricula to help program officers implement police training programs (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011). Bayley and Perito go a step further to analyze the police training programs provided in several SSR programs showing the differences between the programs provided to countries in which donors sought to build a democratic police force compared to countries where donors focused on building paramilitary police forces. Each program had many of the same elements that are common to policing in general. The main difference in training between the two styles is the amount of time devoted to core tasks of basic investigations, legal training, criminal procedure, and public interaction opposed to self defense and paramilitary tactics (Bayley and Perito 2010).

<u>Real World Application of SSR</u>

The most recent international activity within the realm of SSR was in Kosovo, East Timor, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Each instance was the subject of several case studies highlighting aspects of SSR programs that succeeded in some areas and failed in others. In terms of examining these cases to identify lessons that can be applied in other countries, one should note that all of these countries are emerging from prolonged conflict or other cases of significant disruption to national sovereignty and essentially required that their police capabilities be rebuilt anew. Other research has been done about SSR in countries that require reform, but are not emerging from prolonged conflict (Downie 2013). Often, these studies look at SSR through a regional scope to examine what can be done. One region receiving attention in this regard is West Africa (Bryden, N'Diaye, and Olonisakin 2005).

A review of the cases mentioned above leads one to identify common SSR trends. First, SSR is a long-term process that typically lasts at least five years and usually more (Jayamaha et al. 2010; Bayley 2001; Downie 2013). Donor countries conducting the training must be closely involved with determining the scope of the program and must send the right people to provide training and mentorship (Downie 2013). Donor countries generally default to training along the guide of a democratic policing model (Wither 2012; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2005). However, there is a lack of consensus regarding how countries facing active insurgencies should balance the need to build a paramilitary force versus the need to build basic police capabilities consistent with a democratic policing model. A general consensus emerged over recent years that building a paramilitary force in cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan may be more appropriate. The paramilitary force is needed to provide a stronger combat capability to fight active insurgencies and provide space for the development of a police force based on a community-policing model (Bayley and Perito 2010). However, SSR has generally acknowledged that police development based on a democratic or community policing model provides a better long-term response (United Nations 2013). This model also requires a rehabilitated police force to actively work with the community to develop its trust in the police department (Groenewald and Peake 2004; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2008).

Common trends also emerge in terms of specific training areas for police development. Training must incorporate instruction on ethics, human rights, and other basic police skills (Wither 2012; Bayley and Perito 2010). Police development also requires training support for the larger institution as well (Peake 2007; U.S. Agency for

International Development 2011). Training should ensure that headquarters staff and senior officers have the needed skills in management, payroll, procurement, recruiting, leadership, strategic planning, and headquarters management (Peake 2007; Bayley 2001; Downie 2013). Additionally, police development needs to include a focus on building a transparent internal investigative division to investigate allegations of police misconduct and to hold officers accountable who fail to meet the ethical requirements of being a police officer (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011). Failure to rehabilitate the institutional processes of a police force can be just as damaging to an organization as failure to properly train and equip the police officers (Berg 2011; Downie 2013).

Lessons Learned from SSR Case Studies

This study identified several lessons learned from case studies of the police development programs in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The model does not seek to apply every lesson identified from these countries since some issues are specific to a particular country. The lessons identified for use in the police development model highlight common or significant issues for police development programs. Lastly, these case studies do not necessarily indicate that police development efforts in these respective countries have been completely successful. For example, only two years after relinquishing control of East Timor's police, the Policica Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL), the UN had to reassume control in 2006 due to fighting between the PNTL and the military. This fighting became so severe that it led to a breakdown of social order, prompting the UN's return (Wilson 2012). The SSR programs in Kosovo and Sierra Leone have achieved mixed results, but generally in a positive direction (Arnusch and

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Meharg 2010; Baker 2010). These case studies offer lessons, both positive and negative, concerning police development programs.

As noted earlier, SSR is a long-term process. East Timor's SSR program began in 1999 and continued until the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) ended its mandate in 2012 (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste 2014). Kosovo's SSR program began in 1999 (Bajraktari et al. 2006) and continues today in the form of the European Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX) (European Rule of Law Mission Kosovo 2014). SSR began in Sierra Leone in 1998 (Baker 2010). The UN's final mission to Sierra Leone, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) finally ended its operations in March 2014 (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone 2014).

Because SSR is such a long-term process, donor and host countries must be ready to commit a significant amount of time and resources to the effort. Such commitment worked particularly well in Sierra Leone where Great Britain committed whole-heartedly to rebuilding the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) (Krogstad 2012). Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) served as the primary benefactor for Sierra Leone's SSR program, and Sierra Leone's President appointed Keith Biddle, a British police executive, as the head of the SLP (Friedman 2011). Britain's dedicated political and funding support helped ensure that the SLP could rely on a steady funding stream to carry through with its reform programs (Peake 2007). This example is contrasted by the situation in East Timor where the police development program faced significant difficulties due to a lack of funding and personnel from the international community

(Wilson 2012). There was no reliable or significant funding support plan for the PNTL until 2004, when Australia committed AU$40 million over four years (Hood 2006).

Another key aspect to SSR programs is the level of political commitment to change on the part of the host country. The principles of SSR indicate that police development programs should strive to develop a police force that works within a democratic model of policing, and this often times requires significant change on the part of the police organization (Baker 2010). Without dedicated leadership that is committed to the necessary changes and is in a position to lead their implementation, these changes will often fail (Hills 2007). Again, this political commitment was most evident in Sierra Leone as President Kabbah had a vision for the SLP and was willing make the difficult political decisions to further the SLP's development. Some of these issues related to retention of current officers, recruiting of new officers, and reorganization (Friedman 2011). Once again, where Sierra Leone serves as a positive example, the SSR program in East Timor demonstrates how the lack of political commitment detracts from SSR programs. While the UN faced incredible problems in trying to completely build the government of East Timor, its senior leadership did not consult or involve East Timor's local leadership in the course of forming the PNTL. As a result, it lacked meaningful support from the government which was not inclined to provide assistance or guidance as the PNTL formed and developed (Armstrong, Chura-Beaver, and Kfir 2012).

Another key lesson identified in these case studies is that although training and equipping developing police forces is important, police development must also address organizational issues or risk failure (Downie and Cooke 2011). In East Timor, the UN built the PNTL by focusing on quickly recruiting, training, and fielding police officers

with minimal attention to the "back office" functions of running a police organization (Bajraktari et al. 2006). Interim UN reports on the SSR program in East Timor highlight the lack of attention to building management and administrative functions along the lines of human resources, finances, logistics, and strategic planning (Hood 2006). In this regard, both Kosovo and Sierra Leone provide positive examples. Keith Biddle, as Director of the SLP, not only focused on conducting initial training and equipment programs to address immediate problems; he also dedicated significant efforts to building the SLP as an institution (Peake 2007). Specifically, Biddle strengthened the Inspector General's office in a bid to counter corruption. He reformed the recruiting process for the SLP, improved SLP administration, and strengthened its logistics and maintenance (Krogstad 2012). Although the UN did not initially focus on organizational development of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), it did begin a program to build organizational capabilities in the realm of administration, finance, budget, procurement, human resources, communications, and logistics (Ebnother and Fluri 2005).

These cases highlight several lessons regarding training in a developing police force. First, all of these countries emphasized training in basic, core policing functions such as rule of law, ethics, criminal procedure, police operations and procedures, and democratic policing (Bayley and Perito 2010; Peake 2007). However, the foreign trainers who provided the training came with differing skill levels, backgrounds, and doctrine on policing. Not all of the police trainers came from countries that practiced democratic policing. This led to inconsistencies in the training received by the KPS, PNTL, and SLP (Bajraktari et al. 2006). Training must address all stages in an officer's career. Keith Biddle instituted programs to provide not just entry-level training for new SLP officers,

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but also training as officers progressed to supervisory and executive levels (Friedman 2011). Biddle also changed the SLP entry level training to remove the heavy emphasis on military style drill and ceremony, replacing it with training in core policing functions and scenario based instruction to develop the officers' thinking skills (Peake 2007). The KPS built a program where it conducted initial academic coursework at its police academy, then followed that academic portion with dedicated field training under the supervision of an experienced field training officer (Perito and Bayley 2010).

In terms of equipping a developing police force, all three organizations highlight the fact that SSR programs are often confronted with significant problems in terms of providing equipment for developing police organizations. The KPS and PNTL had to be built as completely new organizations, and therefore required extensive equipment support (Bajraktari et al. 2006). While the SLP was not newly created at the onset of Sierra Leone's SSR program, it had suffered significantly as a result of the country's civil war and also required equipment to support its entire organization (Baker 2010). More significantly, these three countries highlight the need for equipment to enable basic police operations. Downie highlights comments by international police trainers stating that developing police organizations do not need advanced equipment that they cannot maintain, or complicated forensic laboratories when the police lack basic evidence collection capabilities and case management systems (Downie 2013). Downie further emphasizes the need for basic equipment when he relates another police trainer's comment about a police officer's most needed piece of equipment being "a pen" (Downie 2013, 23).

In theory, one can see the logic of developing police departments based upon a democratic or community policing model that builds the public's trust in the police department. This in turn builds stability within the country. However, the case studies previously mentioned also highlight the real world issues that work to undermine SSR activities within a country. Several programs have faltered as they neared the time for donor countries or international institutions to turn over responsibilities for police function to the host country (Arnusch and Meharg 2010; Bajraktari et al. 2006). Common issues that have led to failure of SSR programs dealt with the lack of organizational change and political will on the part of the host country to carry out the reforms (Bayley 2001; U.S. Agency for International Development 2011). Particularly in Africa, leaders use security elements to include the police and military as a means of retaining personal power, not protecting the public (Hills 2000). Additionally, equipment provided as part of train and equip programs is typically misused or is outright stolen from the police force (Hills 2007). Recruiting for police positions and selection for advanced training is usually awarded to politically connected candidates. Political appointees to senior police positions often lack the required expertise to adequately lead police organizations. Because of these issues, donor countries providing police development training as part of SSR must identify and work within the local political power structures to determine feasible courses of action for the training programs (Hills 2007).

<p align="center">General Background on Mali</p>

A landlocked, former French colony in West Africa, Mali gained its independence in 1960 (See Figure 1). In its 2013 Human Development Report, the United Nations Develop Program ranks Mali 182 of 186 countries in terms of development, and also as

one the world's 25 poorest countries with a per capita GDP of approximately $1,100

(United Nations Development Program 2013). Estimates state that nearly 40% of Mali's

domestic budget comes from foreign aid (Hoebeke 2013).

Figure 1.   Map of Mali

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html (accessed April 5, 2014). Mali
is a Landlocked country in West Africa. Its vast northern regions lie within the Sahara.

Immediately after independence, Mali fell under one party rule until 1991, when

Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure led a revolt that overthrew the government

because of its violent repression of popular pro-democratic protests (Thurston 2013).

Toure installed a caretaker government that oversaw the process of conducting

democratic elections. In 1992, the Malian people elected Alpha Konare as President in

the country's first democratic, multi-party elections (Stewart 2013). Konare served two

terms as President and peacefully relinquished power to the same Amadou Toure who

overthrew the government in 1991, after Toure won the Presidential elections in 2002

(Arief 2013).

A socialist country during the period of one-party rule, Mali's economy gradually

improved as its relations with the West warmed following its transition to democracy

(Bratton, Coulibaly, and Machado 2002). Despite problems with a nomadic Tuareg

population in the northern half of the country; droughts that severely impacted the

country's agricultural output; and its widespread poverty, Mali was seen as a burgeoning

African democracy and held as a standard for other countries in the region to emulate

(Hoebeke 2013). Presidential elections were scheduled for May 2012, and Mali was

poised for a peaceful transfer of power as President Toure prepared to step down after he

completed his second and last term as President (Mann 2012).

While the rest of the world held Mali as a democratic example for other regional

countries, the nation faced several other problems. Mali's long, uncontrollable borders,

and its vast northern deserts made the country an ideal transit point for criminals

trafficking drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods (Sidibe 2012). In 2006, the Salifist

Group for Preaching and Combat, better known as "GSPC" for the French translation of

its name "Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat," allied itself with Al-Qaida,

and in 2007, changed its name to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM

established bases in the deserts of northern Mali from which it conducted small-scale

terrorist attacks in Algeria and Mauritania as well as the kidnapping of several

Westerners (Council on Foreign Relations 2014). In addition to AQIM, the Malian

government faced increasing problems from a restive Tuareg population in northern Mali

that formed the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA). Bolstered

by fellow Tuaregs who returned to their native Mali due to the Libyan civil war, the

MNLA began to press the Malian government to fully implement its yet unkept promises

that had ended previous Tuareg rebellions (Stewart 2013).

<p align="center">Malian Police Organization</p>

As a former French colony, Mali inherited a French police system. Unlike

America's police organization in which there are numerous local, state, and federal

agencies with law enforcement authority, Mali's law enforcement organizations are

concentrated at a national level under the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil

Protection. The three law enforcement organizations within Mali are the National Police,

the Gendarmerie, and the National Guard (United Nations Security Council 2012). While

the National Police is a solely law enforcement focused organization that is similar to the

American model of policing, the Gendarmerie and National Guard are both paramilitary

organizations. As such, both take direction from Mali's Ministry of Defense and Veterans

in terms of national defense missions, but also have a civilian-policing mandate under the

Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. While each organization is responsible

for providing law enforcement services throughout the country, the jurisdiction for each

organization varies. The National Police have jurisdiction within Mali's cities and urban

areas. The Gendarmerie is responsible for police functions in rural areas not serviced by

the National Police. The National Guard has responsibility for security of certain government facilities as well as policing in rural areas not serviced by the National Police or the Gendarmerie (Bryden, N'Diaye, and Olonisakin 2008)

Mali's National Police

Mali's National Police is responsible for providing law enforcement functions in urban areas throughout the country. Led by the Director General of the National Police, Inspector General Kansaye, the National Police number approximately 5300 officers (Dicko-Zabouye 2010). The National Police are divided into regional commands with one command for each administrative region in Mali. Within each region, each major city has a territorial police division consisting of individual police stations that service that particular city. In addition to the general policing and security provided by each police station, there are specialized units that focus on a single aspect or competency. Units such as the Narcotics Brigade, the Special Investigations Brigade, Mobile Security Group, and the INTERPOL unit provide special capabilities to counter narcotics, conduct complex investigations, control civil unrest, and counter identify theft and other forms of fraud. At the national level, there are also organizations to conduct administrative issues such as finances, communications, and personnel administration. The Director of the National Academy also reports to the Director General. All Malian police officers go through the same police academy located in Bamako (Police National du Mali 2014).

Mali's Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie is a paramilitary organization responsible for law enforcement, protection of persons and property, mainaining public order, and defense of the country.

Led by Director General Benete, the Gendarmerie numbers approximately 3300 officers (Dicko-Zabouye 2010, 23). Like Mali's National Police, the Gendarmerie is led at the national level, and further divided into legions that align with Mali's administrative regions. Within each legion, companies are formed within the key cities in that region. Companies are further divided into brigades that are assigned to smaller towns. Each legion also has 3 to 5 mobile squadrons with the mission of reinforcing other units or re-establishing order where needed. In addition to the operational units of the Gendarmerie, administrative units handle personnel, financial, and logistic administration. Other headquarters units at the national level synchronize investigations involving multiple legions and coordinate operations. (Gendarmerie National du Mali 2014)

Mali's National Guard

Mali's National Guard numbers approximately 3000 individuals and is tasked with providing security of certain government facilities as well as ensuring general order and maintaining public safety. Additionally, it has responsibility for operational defense of Malian territory. (Dicko-Zabouye 2010, 9)

U.S. Police Assistance To Mali

U.S. police assistance to Mali has its roots in the rise of Islamic militant groups in North and West Africa in the early 2000's. The U.S. has actively supported efforts within West Africa to counter terrorism in the region since 2003. As early as 2002, U.S. officials began planning to implement the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to provide military training to countries facing terrorist threats in the region. The 2003 kidnappings of 32 people in the Sahel by the GSPC drew additional attention to the terrorist threat (Thurston 2013). The

program began in 2003 with U.S. military personnel providing training to regional military forces. By 2005, the program evolved into the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, which increased the amount of military training provided to regional countries (Pincus 2013).

In 2003, the U.S. Government began police training in Mali under the ATA Program to complement the training provided to Mali's military (Thurston 2013). Between 2003 and 2005, Malian police received training in Critical Incident Management, Major Case Management, VIP Protection, Airport Security Management, Explosive Incident Countermeasures, Terrorist Crime Scene Investigations, and Senior Level Crisis Management (U.S. Department of State 2005). Prior to a large head of state conference in Mali in 2005, the Minister of Internal Security told a U.S. Embassy Official that nearly 75% of the police assigned to special security details during the conference had received ATA training (U.S. Department of State 2005). The DoS provided $607,000 in funding for ATA training to Mali in fiscal year 2003. Over time, it has gradually increased that amount though 2011, when it had budgeted $1.2M in ATA training for Mali (U.S. Department of State 2005 and U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012).

Until 2012, the U.S. had spent millions of dollars and nearly a decade providing training and assistance to the Malian police. Since America's security related interests in West Africa centered on countering terrorism, U.S. aid to Mali's police focused on providing specialized skills designed to build Mali's anti-terrorism capabilities. As time progressed, the U.S. increased its level of assistance to the Malian police, but maintained its focus on anti-terrorism programs.

The Malian Coup D'Etat of 2012

On January 17, 2012, the MNLA attacked the northern Malian town of Menaka in response to Malian troop movements in the Kidal region of Mali. The fighting spread throughout the Gao and Kidal regions in northern Mali with the MNLA achieving initial success over the Malian army (Thurston 2013). The army's defeats led to several demonstrations within Mali's capital city of Bamako. On February 2, 2012, military families at a military garrison just north of Bamako marched on the Presidential Palace to protest the lack of government support for the military (BBC 2012b). This protest led to rioting in Bamako, consuming the city for the day. Tensions continued to increase in Bamako due to the public's perception of the military's poor performance against the Tuareg rebels (Whitehouse 2012a).

On March 22, 2012, mutinous soldiers overthrew the government in a coup d'etat. Calling themselves the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the Rule of Law (CNRDRE), their leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo, suspended the constitution and took power as the country's President (Arief 2013). On April 8th, Amadou Toure, who had fled Mali, officially resigned as president. Four days later on April 12th, Dioncounda Traore, who had been the President of Mali's National Assembly, was appointed the Interim President in an agreement between the CNRDRE and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Jacinto 2012). This transition of power to civilian authorities averted sanctions imposed by the ECOWAS and prevented the Malian economy from collapsing (Thurston 2013).

The Malian military devolved into chaos and fought amongst itself as a result of the coup. With this opportunity, the MNLA quickly took control of Kidal, Gao, and

Timbuktu which are the three regional capitals in northern Mali (Arief 2013). These cities fell to the MNLA on March 30th, 31st, and April 1st, respectively. Following the MNLA's capture of these key cities, Islamic extremists aligned with Ansar al Din and AQIM moved into Timbuktu, forcing the MNLA from the city (Thurston 2013). This further plunged Mali into chaos as it now faced the challenge of regaining its northern regions from Islamic extremists in addition to recovering from the coup.

<u>Fallout and Implications for U.S. Police Training for Mali</u>

In accordance with U.S. law, the U.S. Government halted all non-humanitarian direct aid to the Government of Mali until a democratically elected government could once again be seated. As such, the ATA program for training Mali's police services was put on an indefinite hold (Department of State 2013c).

Mali also faced other problems because of the continuing instability of the government. Although a civilian interim government was appointed with the express purpose of holding elections, the CNRDRE continued to interfere in domestic politics. Military officers loyal to Captain Sanogo were appointed as the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection (France24 2012). Additionally, demonstrations and occasional riots still took place in Bamako. In May 2012, a crowd of demonstrators forced their way into the Presidential Palace and physically assaulted Interim President Traore, forcing him to leave Mali for two months to seek medical treatment in Paris (Hirsch 2012). In December, 2012, Malian National Guard soldiers at the behest of Captain Sanogo kidnapped the Interim Prime Minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra. He was taken from his house at gunpoint and brought to Captain Sanogo's

headquarters where Diarra was forced to resign his post on national television in the early hours of the morning (Nossiter 2012).

The coup exposed underlying weaknesses in Malian institutions which the international community had failed to fully appreciate. Corruption and nepotism run rampant throughout Malian society (Whitehouse 2012b). Voter turnout in elections averaged approximately 40%, indicating the public's lack of faith in the government. Opinion polls expressed a general dissatisfaction and malaise toward government by the population (Hoebeke 2013).

As with other Malian institutions, the international community failed to note the extent of the fundamental problems within the Malian Police services, which were eventually exposed due to the coup d'etat. In addition to the corruption, lack of funding, and poor equipment that is common to many West African police services, Malian police also suffered from poor management and lack of discipline within the ranks. One can argue that these factors played a significant role in the National Police's operational failures. Leading up to the coup, the failure of the police to provide basic response to crime resulted in the rise of vigilantism (Sinaba 2011). Highlighting the lack of police effectiveness, the public felt that they could not depend on the police to bring criminals to justice, and therefore took matters into their own hands. In the months leading up to the coup, Bamako suffered several occasions of widespread rioting as the public demonstrated against the ongoing Tuareg rebellion in the northern part of the country (Thurston 2013). Some argue that the failure of the police to maintain order and security during these riots and the incurease of vigilantism indirectly led to the coup because they

contributed to the public's general sense of lawlessness and lack of control by the government (Whitehouse 2012c).

International Intervention

In January 2013, fighters loyal to Ansar al Din attacked into the southern half of Mali and quickly broke through Malian military defenses north of Mopti. This setback caused the Malian government to request international assistance. Within a day, French forces based in the region began airstrikes to stop the extremists' southward push (Erlanger and Sayare 2013). Within a week, French forces began a land campaign that regained control of the major cities in Mali's northern regions (Arief 2013).

On April 25, 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2100 passed, authorizing the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013). This peacekeeping mission centered on the deployment of 11,200 troops to establish security in Mali's northern regions and create the conditions for humanitarian assistance programs to recommence (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013). Due to the weakness of the Malian police as an institution and doubt surrounding its ability to protect the Malian government, this resolution also authorized the deployment of 1,440 police officers as part of the mission. The majority of these police would come as Formed Police Units (FPU), each consisting of approximately 120 police officers from other countries. Their primary mission was to protect the institutions of the Malian government, provide security for elections scheduled in August of 2013, and provide some level of training for the Malian police (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013).

<u>Current Gaps in Research</u>

The field of SSR is developing, and the international community is working to develop police forces in weak or failing states. There is a growing body of knowledge regarding the theory behind SSR as well as the results of practical application of these programs in various countries. Examination of specific case studies of SSR yields insights to programs that have been effective, and reasons why other programs have failed to obtain their objectives.

There are however gaps in the common body of knowledge regarding SSR. Although SSR principles and implementation lessons have been identified in numerous sources, they have not been combined in such a way to provide guidance to a comprehensive police development program. One can access the training curricula that have been implemented in different countries conducting police development (Bayley and Perito 2010). One can read about the importance of ensuring that the police are sufficiently developed as an institution (Peake 2007b). One can also read of the importance of host nation and donor nation political will and commitment to the process (U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Department of State 2009; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005).

However, there is no model that shows the interaction between these considerations. Hills offers some examination of the relationship between the police functions in relation to the state's development (Hills 2000.) Harris offers a model to guide the detailed implementation of SSR programs (Harris 2005). This model is good for guiding program implementation once major goals have been identified. The Hills

model is very broad and does not offer guidance on how to prioritize and focus police development efforts. Harris' model assumes that guidance as a start point and provides a specific process to implement specific programs. There is a gap between the two models that determines how police development programs should focus their overall efforts. Without this model, SSR programs risk implementing development programs that do not address critical issues in the organizations they are trying to develop.

Despite years of international programs intended to assist Mali in its fight against terrorism, very little writing has been done that focuses specifically on SSR within Mali. Additionally, very little writing has been done to describe the Malian National Police. Where Mali has been addressed, it is frequently done in the context of a review of regional SSR initiatives within Western Africa. In addition to the dearth of research specifically addressing Mali, the larger context of SSR seems to conflict between the underlying theory and its real world application. Nowhere has the theory of SSR been viewed through the lens of lessons learned from actual implementation to develop a practical model of SSR that is based in sound theory but also accounts for real world impediments to accomplish SSR. Furthermore, such a model has not been evaluated against development programs and policy goals to identify possible courses of action in terms of police development.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

General Process

The coup d'etat highlighted certain basic, fundamental problems with Mali's police that prevented them from providing a basic level of security and law enforcement for the country. As it prepares to resume direct assistance to the Malian Government, the U.S. should reassess the current situation in Mali and the status of the Malian police. It should take this opportunity to assess its previous program and determine if it can improve its training and development for the Malian police to address its most pressing issues. The U.S. should determine where gaps exist between the needs of the Malian police and the capabilities provided by its previous program.

This study develops a general model for foreign police development and applies it to America's previous program for the Malian police to identify these gaps. Once these gaps have been identified, the U.S. can adjust its training program as required to address these problems. As depicted in Figure 2, this study answers the primary research question of, "What approach should the U.S. take toward training the Malian police?"

By using a qualitative research methodology, this study begins with a thorough survey of SSR research, examining SSR theory to identify key principles, common consensus, and other critical factors in police development relating to the conduct of SSR programs. This survey of previous research provides a collection of common training standards and goals, priority areas of focus, common curricula, desired capabilities, equipment requirements, and long-term police development objectives.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

What approach should the U.S. take toward training the Malian police?

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│ Review Security Sector│      │ Case Study Review of │
│   Reform Theory      │      │ Recent Police        │
│                      │      │ Development Efforts  │
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Model Development

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┌──────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Current U.S. Police  │      │ Research Model for   │
│ Training Program in  │      │ Police Development   │
│       Mali           │      │   Applied to Mali    │
└──────────────────────┘      └──────────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────────────┐
              │ Results Comparison to│
              │ Test the Validity of │
              │  the Research Model  │
              └──────────────────────┘
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Model Validation

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┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Police Development Model     │
│ Provides Direction for U.S.  │
│ Training Program for the     │
│     Malian Police            │
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Answer the Research Question

Figure 2.   Research Methodology

Source: Created by author. This figure shows the process used to create a general police development model and apply to Mali to identify how the U.S. should conduct its training program for the Malian police.

Next, this research examines case studies of police development programs to identify lessons learned and common factors leading to success or failure in police

development. This portion of the study identifies common practices and policies supporting success or failure in those police development programs. Examining these case studies also identifies certain prerequisite conditions for police development programs to succeed.

Composing the Police Development Model

In an effort to develop a framework that donor countries can use to determine necessary actions to take in developing a foreign police force, this study has devised a generic police development model. The intent behind it is to identify and prioritize capabilities that should be developed in foreign police organizations. It is not intended to provide a lockstep methodology for police development programs, but rather to serve as a guide to identify key issues that must be considered as well as a prioritization of capabilities that must be developed in complex situations. To ensure that the model provides guidance in accordance with international norms, it accounts for key principles in the field of SSR. The model also identifies lessons learned from case studies of police development programs in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. By using this approach, the model is based on SSR fundamentals and informed by field experience to account for difficulties and successes in actual SSR program implementation.

SSR Principles

The SSR principles enumerated by the UN, the OECD—DAC, and the U.S. will serve as the basis for the SSR principles in this study's police development model. The UN and the OECD—DAC respectively represent the international community as a whole, and typical donor countries (Schnabel and Born 2011). The U.S. principles certainly

apply, as this model is being developed in order to identify how the U.S. should approach

its future training program for the Malian police. This model will focus on the general

SSR principles that SSR must be sensitive to local conditions and must have host nation

support at appropriate levels. It must take a holistic approach and examine multiple areas

affecting police development. It must be based on democratic norms that emphasize rule

of law and human rights. Lastly, security organizations must be accountable to the

population and transparent in their functioning.

As these principles are applied within a police development model, they imply

several goals. Police development programs should strive to build police organizations

that operate with a democratic policing model (Organization for Security Co-operation in

Europe 2008). In many post-conflict states, this will likely require a significant change to

the way the police function and may require a fundamental change in a police

organization's core values (Krogstad 2012). Additionally, a holistic approach that looks

at different aspects of police development will necessarily go beyond common "train and

equip" development programs and have to address institutional reform. (Downie and

Cooke 2011).

<u>Lessons Learned</u>

The case studies of the SSR programs for Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor

highlight the friction and problems that come with trying to apply SSR principles in the

field. SSR is a long term, expensive project that requires significant dedication in terms

of both financial and political support on the part of both donor and host countries. It

cannot rely simply on short-term train and equip programs, but must also build

institutional capability for the police force in terms of administrative processes, strategic

planning, logistics, financial management, human resources, and communications

support. Without the ability to perform these functions as well as core policing duties, a

police organization runs the risk of failure. While organizational development is critically

important, train and equip programs must still be executed as well. Training should take a

long-term approach that educates an officer at every stage of his career. Entry-level

training should also include dedicated classroom time at an academy followed by a

period of field training to reinforce practices learned in the classroom. Equipping

programs can be incredibly expensive as a police force is rebuilt, and must focus initially

on providing basic equipment to facilitate the daily performance of police duties rather

than advanced equipment that the organization cannot sustain long-term.

The Police Development Model

As depicted in Figures 3 and 4, this study has devised a police development

model that is based upon principles from SSR theory as well as lessons identified in the

SSR programs for Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. Within each development

category Complete Security Sector Reform, Institutional Development, Equipping, and

Training), the model also suggests typical actions that should be accomplished. These are

shown in figure 4.

Police Development Model

Figure 3.   Police Development Model

Source: Created by author. This model provides a framework for determining necessary development actions to take in the course of a SSR program. Assuming the prerequisite conditions are present, the types of development actions in the pyramid generally correspond to the level of national development scale on the left. Actions that are lower on in the pyramid must receive priority.

Development Activities

- Complete Security Sector Reform Program
    - Complete Reconstruction of the Police Organization and System
- Institutional Reform
    - Organizational Change focusing on Democratic Policing, Ethics, Human Rights
    - Organizational Development and training to include: Administration, Human Resources/ Recruiting, Policy, Leadership, Fiscal Management, Strategic Planning, Logistics, Training Development
- Equipping
    - Individual and Precinct equipping to include Vehicles, Maintenance Support, Individual Equipment, Personal Protective Equipment, Investigative Kits
    - Organizational program to include office/IT supplies, IT systems, Case Management System, Enterprise Communications, Limited Specialized Equipment
- Training
    - A Tiered Approach to Develop All Levels of the Organization in Basic Skills, Supervision/ Management, Values/Ethics, Human Rights, Communication Skills
    - Limited Specialized Training to Develop Individuals/Units Capable of Conducting Complex Investigations, Regional/International Crime, Anti-Terrorism, Riot Control/Civil Disturbance, Executive Protection

Figure 4.   Development Activities

Source: Created by author. This shows typical actions that should be accomplished within each category of the police development model.

The Police Development Model Explained

The police development model consists of three key aspects. First, the left side of the model depicts a graduated scale that accounts for the general security and development situation within a country. It begins at the bottom of the scale at "Failed State" progressing upward through "Post-Conflict," "Weak," "Developing," and ending at "Developed."

The next key aspect of the model is the pyramid that depicts the types of actions that need to taken in a police development program. It begins at the bottom of the

pyramid with "Complete Security Sector Reform," and progresses upward through "Institutional Development," then to "Equipping," and ends at "Training." This portion of the model is also depicted as a graduated scale with the color bands generally matching the required actions in the pyramid with the country's general security and development level to the left. The pyramid is used to depict the required actions because the lower a country falls on the security and development scale, it generally requires more support to develop its police to a fully functioning, democratic police force. As a country progresses up to the point where it is fully developed, its police require fewer development activities, which may be limited to training in advanced skills and possibly advanced equipment support.

The base of the model serves as the foundation of the pyramid and describes key prerequisite conditions that should be met for SSR programs to take place. This includes the commitment of the host nation leadership to the SSR process, identification of the host nation's stated SSR needs, and donor country willingness to support long term SSR efforts with the right personnel and stable funding support.

The security and development scale, the development pyramid, and the prerequisite base of the police development model combine to show the complexities and interrelationships between a country's security situation and level of development, the political factors affecting SSR programs, and the different functional areas that must be addressed for successful SSR. As a country is assessed to determine its security situation and development status on the left side of the model, it generally corresponds to the required actions that must be taken within the center pyramid. The model is designed to indicate needed development actions by working upward from the corresponding band on

development/security situation scale. Activities lower in the pyramid will necessarily incorporate the activities listed above it. For example, failed states generally require a complete security sector reform program (DuPont, Grabosky, and Shearing 2003). As part of reconstructing the police force, this program will necessarily involve institutional development, training, and equipping the organization. Weak or developing countries may only require equipping. However, that will also require additional training.

The color bands gradually transition from red to yellow, and then to green to indicate that there are no definitive transitions from one action to another. For example, a needs assessment may determine that a country's police organizations meet requirements and adequately perform the functions that would be addressed by institutional development action, but that they could use assistance in a few select areas. The gradual change between each development activity depicts that some activities in different bands may occur at the same time. Although the position of a development activity is intended to indicate its priority (with lower items having higher priority), it is not intended to be a lockstep process that must go sequentially from one action to the next.

The prerequisite conditions are positioned at the base of the development activity pyramid to serve as a foundation for all of the SSR actions. Without those prerequisite conditions being present, lessons show that SSR programs risk not achieving their goals. If those conditions are not present, donor countries should work to set those conditions as best they can (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011).

Lastly, this police development model is applicable to any country. While the focus of SSR is primarily geared toward countries that are post-conflict, failed, or weak, police organizations throughout the world can still improve. Police in developed

countries still benefit from advanced training and equipment programs as new methods and technologies emerge. Some developed police organizations may even require portions of institutional development actions to address problems that arise. The model serves to help identify and prioritize development actions because institutional development actions should take precedence over receiving advanced equipment or training.

<div align="center">Validating the Model and Answering the Research Question</div>

This study specifically focuses on case studies of recent police development programs in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. These cases have been chosen because they more closely replicate the current situation in Mali than other recent police develop programs. Additionally, these cases are not concentrated in one geographical area. Selecting a case from Europe, Asia, and Africa helps ensure that issues common to police development regardless of locale factor into the model.

While Iraq and Afghanistan serve as the most prominent examples of police development activities, these two cases are unique in SSR efforts because of the underlying security situations and the level of effort on the part of donor countries. Iraq and Afghanistan each faced significant insurgencies that threatened the stability of their respective governments and dictated a more paramilitary approach for police development programs. Additionally, the level of commitment in terms of time and funding by the international community is not common in most SSR programs. East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo on the other hand, are closer to Mali's current situation. While each country saw a significant effort on the part of Western donor countries, they did not have the significant funding outlays or prolonged effort that was provided to Iraq

or Afghanistan. While each country had political and social issues to overcome, none of them had an active insurgency posing a serious threat to the stability of the country as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Using key principles within SSR theory and common lessons learned from real world police development programs, this study develops a generic model for police development. Based on SSR theory and informed by practical application, this model describes a general process by which the donor community can provide police training and development to foreign countries with a reasonable expectation of sustainable progress and long-term success. This model describes development objectives, training goals, general standards, and implementation methods. This model also describes key prerequisite conditions that must be present for successful police development programs.

This study validates the generic police development model by comparing it to current U.S. police training activities in Mali. It begins by base-lining America's police development efforts in Mali through March 2012, when Mali suffered the coup d'etat. This describes the training that has been provided to the Malian police and then reviews their current capabilities and performance. Once the baseline has been established, the police development model is then applied to the current situation in Mali to include describing the model's recommendations for police development and training. Any differences between the current training process and the model's recommendations are then evaluated to verify the model offers a better system for implementing police development programs.

Once the police development model is validated, the study answers the primary research question of, "What approach should the U.S. take toward training the Malian

police?" In the course of validating the model, gaps and shortfalls are identified between the current process and the model's recommendations, which show the current development approach is lacking several aspects police development aspects that should be applied to Mali. By identifying these gaps, the model provides the answer of how the U.S. should approach training for the Malian police.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Process

As noted in the research methodology, this study analyzed the U.S. training

program for Mali's police prior to the coup d'etat to determine what actions were

implemented and determine their results. The study then applied the police development

model to Mali to determine what development actions should be taken to improve Mali's

police and to identify likely results from those actions. Comparing the results from

America's pre-coup training program against likely results from the development actions

called for by the model show that the model does offer a better method of developing

foreign police organizations.

Current U.S. Assistance for Mali's Police

Until the March 2012 coup d'etat, America's development effort for Mali's police

services centered on training and equipping programs, aimed at strengthening Mali's

ability to counter the growing terrorist threat within its borders. As such, DoS's ATA

program comprised the majority of assistance the U.S. provided to Mali's police (U.S.

Government Accountability Office 2012). As early as 2010, planning was underway to

increase America's efforts by implementing additional INL programs to enhance the

training provided at Mali's National Police Academy as well as improving the country's

ability to conduct forensic investigations (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2013a). However, this program was

never actually implemented due to the cessation of U.S. Government aid resulting from the coup (U.S. State Department 2013c).

Information available on ATA efforts in Mali is limited. ATA reports show that between 2003 and 2005, ATA conducted the following courses in Mali: Critical Incident Management, Major Case Management, VIP Protection, WMD Awareness Seminar, Airport Security Management, Railway Security Operations, Explosive Incident Countermeasures, Terrorist Crime Scene Investigations, and Senior Crisis Management (U.S. State Department 2005). Figures available for ATA funding for training in Mali started at $607,000 in 2003 and increased to over $1.2M in 2005. No information is available on funding from 2006-2009, however, in 2010 and 2011 ATA funding for training in Mali was $1.14M and $1.2M respectively (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). While the exact courses offered to Malian police are not publicly available, one can reasonably assume that the courses would come from the list of courses provided in APPENDIX A, which contains the list of courses offered under the ATA program (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General 2012). These courses all relate to training a specific capability to enhance Mali's efforts to counter the regional terrorist threat, and strive to train advanced skillsets.

In Fiscal Year 2010, INL received funding to assist Malian police. The program's objectives were to build Mali's capability to counter regional terrorist groups and criminal networks. This program consisted of several different components. It intended to provide assistance to Mali's police academy and improve its overall police training program. It sought to train a FPU of Malian police who were capable of deploying to UN Peacekeeping missions. It began coordinating with the UN and FBI to develop an

automated fingerprint identification system. And lastly, it sought to provide training to

Malian and other regional police on countering money laundering and other financial

crimes. However, due to the coup d'etat, these programs were suspended before they

could be fully implemented (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs 2013a).

<div align="center">Results</div>

African police services are generally characterized as being understaffed,

underequipped, lacking professional police skills, and lacking modern organizational

management processes (Hills 2000). Mali is no different. While the Malian police could

conduct some police functions and have a small measure of success, it lacked certain

basic capabilities expected of any police force and suffered internal problems that showed

significant weaknesses in its ability to function and enforce rule of law (Hoebeke 2013).

Its lack of basic resources necessary for policing, widespread corruption, infighting

between different factions along with other organizational problems fundamentally

challenged its ability to provide security and law enforcement capabilities to the Malian

people (Sidibe 2012).

Numbering approximately 5300 officers, Mali's police are significantly

undermanned as well as under-resourced (Dicko-Zoubaye 2011). Mali's previous

Director General of National Police, Alioune Diamoutne, stated that he wished to hire up

to 4,000 new officers to be able to police the entire country (L'Independant 2013). Mali's

police face problems with policing in the desolate northern regions of the country that

would challenge a developed country. Its lack of personnel and resources also extends

into Mali's capital city of Bamako. One recent newspaper article highlighted the lack of

equipment at one police precinct in Bamako. There were no operational vehicles for patrol or response forcing officers to respond using their own private vehicles which are more commonly mopeds. Additionally, the article highlighted an officer whose vehicle was significantly damaged, but the department was unable to pay for repairs, forcing him to pay for it out of pocket (L'Indicateur de Renouveau 2013). In its early assessments of Mali's security sector, the UN has described the lack of equipment and logistical support that inhibits the police from performing basic functions (United Nations Security Council 2012).

Mali's police suffer from widespread corruption (Sidibe 2012). While this is a common phenomena for Africa, it still serves to undermine police authority and government legitimacy (Hills 2000). Several different newspaper articles in Bamako have decried the commonality of drivers being pulled over for imagined infractions by traffic police who simply avail themselves of an opportunity to extort bribes from the drivers (Ibrahim 2012). The DoS's 2013 Report on Human Rights Practices for Mali states, "Corruption in the judiciary is widespread. Police were not held accountable for corruption. Officials, police, and gendarmes frequently extorted bribes." (Department of State 2013b, 16) Lastly, noted anthropologist Bruce Whitehouse, who has extensive Mali research experience, has described the extent of corruption in Malian government that includes selling appointments to the National Police and Gendarmerie (Whitehouse 2012b).

The Malian police also suffer significant internal problems. Arguably, the most pressing issue facing police leadership is the continued infighting within the National Police between factions represented by different police unions. These unions represent

officers at different ranks with a union each for the junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and commissioners who are the leadership of the National Police (L'Independant, 2014). Additionally, leadership of the Syndicat de Police Nationale (SNP), the union representing the non-commissioned officers, has ties to the CNRDRE, which led the March 2012 coup (Diarra 2014; Takiou and Medjo 2012). Issues relating to favoritism shown to officers from this union by the leader of the CNRDRE continue to plague the National Police (Camara 2013). These problems have led to police unions taking to the streets of Bamako in protest and have even led to open fighting between the factions with shots being fired between the factions resulting in fatalities (Camara 2013). This problem was so significant that the previous Director General of the National Police was sacked in part because of his failure to bring the police unions in line (RFI 2013).

The lack of personnel and equipment, corruption, and political infighting within the National Police are the most significant of a list of problems that undermine the National Police and affect the legitimacy of the national government. These problems have led to a failure to provide the basic services of security and rule of law. This basic failure is demonstrated in two examples. In the months preceding the coup, Bamako saw a sharp increase of "Article 320" justice (Whitehouse 2012c). This is the local term for vigilante justice and relates to the cost of buying the fuel and matches to burn a criminal alive. On multiple occasions, local citizens caught thieves in the act and punished them by mob rule rather than handing the guilty party over to the police. Local newspapers cite citizens' frustration at the inability or unwillingness of the police and the judicial system to properly deal with criminals, hence the increase in vigilante justice (Sinaba 2011). In addition to the increase of vigilante justice, the Malian police's inability to provide

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security and rule of law is highlighted by the inclusion of 1,440 police officers as part of MINUSMA. This number of officers includes plans for 8 FPUs of 120 officers and 320 individual officers to support the UN peacekeeping efforts. While these police are to assist Mali in establishing a law enforcement capability as it re-establishes governance in the north, they are also intended to provide some law enforcement assistance in the southern part of the country which has always remained under government control (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 2013).

U.S. assistance to Malian police has been predicated on the goal of helping Mali confront the threats of regional terrorist and criminal groups. Given the lack of equipment and the poor level of training that the Malian police must deal with, this assistance in the form of train and equip programs has likely provided some benefits to the Malian police. Without such support, there is simply no other way that the Malian police could build specialized skills or expertise to counter terrorism. However, the problems facing Mali's police go far deeper than simply confronting terrorist or organized criminal activity. The problems of lack of training and equipment, widespread corruption, and internal issues inhibit the Malian police from providing basic security and rule of law for the general public. This undermines the public's faith in the police as well as its confidence in the Malian government, which was one of many factors that led to the coup d'etat. While U.S. assistance to the Malian police before the coup sought to build Mali's capability to counter significant problems, it did not focus on the most significant issues facing the police. Because of this, one can state that American support to the Malian police could have been better utilized by addressing more significant issues.

Applying the Model: Assessing Prerequisite Conditions

Any development program begins with a comprehensive needs assessment (U.S.

Agency for International Development 2011). Several different systems for assessing

SSR and police requirements that satisfy the police development model have already

been built and are readily available for use. One such model is the Police Reform

Indicators and Measurement Evaluators (PRIME) System developed by researchers at

Princeton University (Bajraktari et al. 2006, 1). This system measures major areas such as

performance effectiveness, management and oversight, community relations, and

sustainability. *USAID's Field Guide: Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement in*

Developing Countries provides another system for methodically assessing a police force

and designing a supporting development program (U.S. Agency for International

Development 2011).

As one applies the police development model to Mali, the first requirement is to

determine it the necessary prerequisite conditions of host nation leadership support,

expressed needs, and donor nation commitment in terms of funding and personnel exist.

As this study does not access U.S. Government held information or gain direct access to

Malian police leadership to gauge its overall support and stated needs, this study proceeds

under the calculated assumption that these conditions in fact exist.

Mali's political leadership was elected under a mandate to change conditions that

contributed to the coup. UN reports assessing the conditions in Mali state that Malian

leadership recognized the newly elected government would have to work to resolve the

issues of corruption, weak rule of law and security sector, and poor governance (United

Nations Security Council 2012). Additionally, Director General Kansaye of the National

Police assumed his duties in November 2013 as a result of his predecessor's failure to bring the police unions into order with an implied mandate to improve the National Police (RFI 2013). Based on this information, one can reasonably infer that there is a certain level of support for police development within the national as well as police leadership.

Gauging the extent of donor country support involves determining the required activities and working with donors to ensure their commitment in terms of time, funding and personnel. As needs are identified and programs designed to rectify problems, donor countries can fully assess the costs and level of involvement for their personnel. By correctly identifying issues, designing programs, and using realistic expectations, donor countries will determine if they are willing to fully support a development program before their launch. One can reasonably assume that by performing a complete assessment, going into the process with reasonable expectations, and implementing well-designed programs, donor countries will have the necessary level of commitment in terms of funding and personnel support to sustaining the long-term process needed for police development.

<u>Applying the Model: Assessing The Malian Police</u>

A broad, overarching view of the situation in Mali identifies several key factors that affect a possible police development program. Emerging from a Tuareg rebellion and a recent coup d'etat, and recently regaining control of its northern regions from Islamic extremists, Mali is a post-conflict state. Due to recent allegations of political interference by the CNRDRE, widespread corruption throughout Malian government institutions as a whole, and Mali's previous single political party history, one can argue that the style of

Malian policing is biased toward a political style, not a democratic or community policing style. Although Mali is post-conflict, its police institutions do not need to be completely rebuilt. The organizations are still viable, functioning, and provide basic infrastructure that police development programs can build upon. This indicates that Mali falls between "post-conflict" and "weak" on the police development model's security and development scale.

UN assessments of the Malian security sector and the previous section describing the results of America's training program for Malian police highlight several issues that need to be addressed. The UN assessment specifically highlights that, "Corruption and financial crime is rampant in the security services, as in all government departments. This situation detracts from the credibility and the authority of the state." (United Nations Security Council 2012, 202). Regarding security services in the northern parts of Mali it says, "Security and judicial services are still insufficiently established in the hinterland of the country, due to the low concentration of structures and staff. . . . Where they exist, these services are not well organized and do not function effectively because staff are not adequately trained." (United Nations Security Council 2012, 202). The report recommends that, "In the area of internal security, the strategic objectives would be to strengthen the operational abilities of the security forces by improving the legal framework, equipment and infrastructure, as well as increasing staffing. Other strategic objectives would be, firstly, to ensure that the professional ethics of the services are complied with by increasing internal controls." (United Nations Security Council 2012, 203). The report also states, "There is also a requirement to support the longer-term process of transforming the security sector architecture. This needs to be balanced with

immediate efforts to bolster its operational capacities to restore territorial integrity."
(United Nations Security Council 2012, 203). This assessment clearly highlights the need
for development programs to address organizational issues within the Malian police in
addition to training and equipment. This also correlates with Mali's position on the police
development model's security and development scale.

The previous section describing the results of America's training program for the
Malian police also highlighted several issues that need to be addressed. The ongoing
conflict within the police unions has an incredibly negative impact on the public's
perception of the Malian police (Traore 2014). The union problems also point to a lack of
discipline and problems with the core values and concept of duty within the police
department. The previous section also highlighted a lack of training in core police
functions that impeded their ability to provide security and ensure rule of law.
Additionally, the lack of equipment to perform even basic patrolling functions is a
significant impediment to the police's ability to provide for security and rule of law. This
reinforces the need for institutional development as well as equipping and training
support.

Applying the Model: Identifying Development Needs

When applied to the police development model, the factors listed above indicate
that Malian police need several different forms of assistance. As stated earlier, Malian
police organizations are intact and provide some level of law enforcement, so this
situation does not call for a complete rebuild of the law enforcement sector and its
organizations. As one examines institutional development issues, the need for assistance
to rectify key issues in organizational reform and development becomes readily apparent.

Additionally, the need for additional training and equipping to address basic shortfalls is also evident.

The issues concerning widespread corruption, poor performance, and organizational infighting all indicate the need for significant organizational reform to address these foundational issues within the Malian police. These changes would necessarily come in many different forms. Some development activities will be simply working with the Malian police to improve bureaucratic structures and processes to ensure better management. Some activities will require implementing significant changes to existing programs. Based on the police development model, the most difficult will likely be the organizational change required to instill a change of values so that the Malian police can better serve the local populace.

<center>Organizational Development</center>

In terms of institutional development, the police development model indicates that the Malian National Police should undertake several actions. Many of the activities needed to address the fundamental problems within Mali's police are interrelated. For example, no single action will resolve the issue of corruption within the police. However, several related actions can be taken that will combine to reduce corruption within the police. Some of the same actions taken to counter corruption will also have the effect of improving performance and reducing internal strife within the organization.

To address corruption, the Malian police could begin by strengthening the organization of the Inspector General within the National Police. This office serves an equivalent function of an internal affairs bureau within an American police depart and is charged with investigating and recommending sanctions against police who abuse their

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authority in Mali. By strengthening this office and supporting its efforts to investigate and discipline Mali's police, the organization can begin to reduce corruption.

Additionally, reforming the organization's recruiting processes and standards can also make substantial headway in countering corruption if the changes are truly supported within the organization's leadership. Since recruits often have to pay bribes in order to have their applications to the national police academy, it only encourages a culture of corruption once they complete training and arrive at their field assignments. Instituting processes that reduce the possibilities for internal interference and focus on choosing candidates based upon merit and not family connections reduces corruption by eliminating corrupt policies and by recruiting better individuals, which also helps to professionalize the force.

Improving administrative processes and procedures can likely help the Malian police in many ways. Once again, tightening administrative processes reduces the possibility of corruption by reducing the ability to hide wrongdoing. It also helps to improve the overall management of the organization which can serve to reinforce positive changes by improving police officers' and the general public's view of the National Police. In addition to strengthening administrative processes, instituting actions to support organizational design, strategic planning, and policy development also help to improve the organization by giving it a roadmap and supporting other development initiatives.

Most importantly within the realm of organizational development, Malian police leadership should work to inculcate values that reinforce democratic policing and a general notion of service to the public. While this is most important, it is also the most

difficult aspect to address because it involves changing the organization's fundamental values and ethics from what has existed for decades. Many different models have been developed to proscribe the actions needed to effect organizational change. However, changing the culture of the entire organization that is spread throughout the country from previous ways of conducting business will take significant effort and emphasis on the part of the police leadership (Baker 2010). Without changing the organization's fundamental values to emphasize those in line with democratic policing and ensuring the average officer on the street fully espouses them in day to day actions, the organization will never rise above the corruption, petty infighting, and poor performance to gain the trust of the average Malian citizen.

<div align="center">Equipment</div>

The model also identifies certain equipping requirements for the Malian police. The UN reports point to the insufficient equipment levels within the Malian police, and the international community has also recognized the need over several years of assistance programs. The initial assessment should identify specific equipment shortfalls that prevent the Malian police from conducting their basic missions of enforcing rule of law and ensuring security. While the assessment should also identify equipment requirements to enable advanced police capabilities, these should take a secondary priority to basic needs.

The first priority should be to ensure that officers have the required equipment to perform their daily duties. This would include personal safety equipment such as uniforms, weapons, restraints, and personal protective equipment. It should also include other equipment required for daily work, such as communications equipment and patrol

vehicles to permit at least a basic response capability for each precinct. Another category of equipment support that should be high priority is facilities and office equipment. The police precincts should have adequate facilities to coordinate operations, conduct investigations, and detain individuals in the judicial process. Additionally, adequate office supplies need to be in place. Sometimes, basic pens and paper are more important to a struggling precinct than the newest technology (Marenin 1986).

The needs assessment should also identify specialized equipment or other needs that should be fulfilled in order for the organization to provide basic services. The UN reports have specifically noted the deficiency of riot control equipment. While this is not required on a daily basis, it is certainly a type of specialized equipment that should be supported. Other types of specialized equipment may include basic evidence collection kits to preserve evidence for later forensic examination if needed. Other needs may include training academy facility repairs or improvements.

<u>Training</u>

Due to the police's poor basic training, the model also shows that additional training is required for the Malian police. Some of the required training must be done to reinforce and entrench new methods and values that the organizational development activities will seek to implement. Some of the training will need to be done in order to build basic core competencies in rule of law and criminal procedure. The organizational development actions call for changing the organization's core values to emphasize democratic policing and rule of law. For these values and ethics to permeate throughout the entire organization, its training programs must institute a training syllabus to ensure that all of its officers have been indoctrinated. It is not enough to simply teach new values

to recruits undergoing their basic training. It must also be taught to officers and leaders at all levels of the organization. Without expanding the training outside of the police academy, newly graduated officers will arrive at their precincts and quickly fall into the old ways of business because what they were taught at the academy was not reinforced and executed on the street by senior officers and leadership (Peake 2007).

The training program will also need to be examined to determine if it meets the organization's larger needs of providing trained police throughout the entire organization. Typically, police training in Africa consists of an officer's training at the police academy, and then any other specialized classes they can receive throughout their career (Hills 2000). Due to lack of resources, there is rarely any refresher or in service training to ensure that officers are using the most current procedures and prevent them from developing bad habits. Additionally, there are rarely different courses of training for officers as they promote within the organization. Mali's police training syllabus should seek to build a training program that develops skills for officers at all levels of the organization, from entry level, through supervision and management, and ultimately to executive level positions. Programs should be established to ensure that procedures and values taught in the classroom are reinforced by being fully embraced and implemented in the field. As the model describes, this normally calls for some time of classroom instruction followed by periods of field training under the supervision of more experienced mentors within the police precincts.

The training program should also be evaluated to determine if the most needed skillsets are being taught to proficiency. This should generally emphasize core police skills of conflict resolution, communications, investigations, interviewing, local law,

department policies and procedures, and use of force (Bayley and Perito 2010). As needed, specialized skills can be developed through unit specific training such as riot control/civil disturbance, complex investigations, narcotics, and dignitary protection. Changes to the training syllabus do not need to be built from scratch. As seen in the case studies for Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, several international organizations have developed basic curricula to build a democratic police capability. These programs can be modified as necessary to meet particular requirements or cultural issues specific to Mali.

Assessing the Previous Program vs. The Model

Examining the previous training program for the Malian police and the police development model show that the model can provide a better method for developing the Malian police. Figure 5 depicts the U.S. development program for Malian Police priot to the coup as it would look on the police development model. While the ATA training provided training in valuable skills for the Malian police, it did not address fundamental problems within the Malian police that contributed to more significant problems for the country as a whole. ATA's focus is solely on assisting host nations to build capabilities that can counter or prevent the spread of terrorism. The initial needs assessment process for building an ATA plan for a host country evaluates a country's capabilities in 25 functional areas to detect, deter, deny, and defeat terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2005). As such, this provides a limited view of the host country's police. Because of the anti-terrorism focus, this process does not evaluate a country's basic policing capacity or effectiveness.

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Police Development Model

Figure 5.   Pre-Coup U.S. Development Program for the Malian Police.

Source: Created by author. This figure depicts the U.S. development program for Mali's police prior to the coup as shown on the police development model. U.S. efforts focused on training with some equipping of the Malian police and did not address institutional development actions. This was based in part on an incorrect assumption that the Malian police were more developed than was actually the case.

In Mali, this anti-terrorism focus did not identify or address fundamental issues within the Malian police that prevented it from fulfilling its most basic mission of providing security and rule of law to the Malian population. The ATA courses did not address the problems of police corruption and infighting or organizational deficiencies. Mali's lack of a forensic investigation capability did not lead to the overthrow of the government. However, police corruption, which undermined the public's faith in the government and the police's inability to ensure civil order in Bamako indirectly

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contributed the coup d'etat. This shows that America's previous training program had significant limitations in its assistance for Mali's police.

Where ATA's limited scope prevents a comprehensive assessment to identify key issues build a development program to address priority requirements, the police development model provides that capability. By assessing the needs of a foreign police service through the full spectrum of potential actions from completely rebuilding the organization to strengthening the institution through organizational development assistance, to providing equipment and training, the police development model provides a comprehensive view of the organization's needs. Based on the problems identified, it provides potential actions and a simple prioritization to focus the efforts of donor countries. Figure 6 depicts the areas where the U.S. should focus its development efforts as shown on the police development model.

Police Development Model

Figure 6.   Recommended U.S. Development Actions for the Malian Police

Source: Created by author. This figure shows the development actions that the police development model recommends for the Malian police. They begin with institutional development actions to rectify fundamental issues within the Malian police and also includes equipping and training.

Prior to the coup, the international community failed to appreciate the significance of the problems within Mali's government institutions and chose instead to focus on the positive aspects of a seemingly stable democracy in the region (Hoebeke 2013). As a result of this outlook, America's police development training for Mali assumed that the police institutions needed training and equipment to support their development of advanced policing skills, hence the focus on building Mali's anti-terrorism capacity rather than building basic police skills. Had the U.S. evaluated Mali's police in terms of the

police development model, key problems within Mali's police would have been identified. Necessary development actions could have been taken to address institutional shortcomings in addition to the training and equipment that had been provided. By improving the police institutions, the U.S. could have helped to better address critical issues within the police that have contributed to larger problems within the country.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>Conclusions</u>

This study began as an effort to identify better methods for conducting foreign police develop programs. The field of SSR has become more important in recent years as the international community finds itself engaged in more frequent efforts to rebuild different portions of a nation's security sector. Since the end of the Cold War, countries emerging from years of communist rule and several post conflict countries have required some form of assistance to strengthen their security apparatus. This assistance has ranged from simple train and equip programs to the UN assuming police authorities in a country as it attempts to completely rebuild its security institutions anew as in East Timor and Kosovo. The U.S. in particular provides police training as well as equipment to numerous countries around the world. The effectiveness of America's police training program in Mali was recently questioned after Mali suffered a coup d'etat despite the U.S. spending millions of dollars and nearly a decade training the Malian police.

Due to the mandatory halt in U.S. assistance to Mali as a result of the coup, the U.S. has an opportunity to reassess its training program for the Malian police. With this opportunity, this study began with the goal of answering the primary research question of, "What approach should the U.S. take toward training the Malian police?" Secondary research questions the study sought to answer were, "What knowledge can the U.S. gain from the academic study of foreign police development programs?" and "What lessons have been learned from real-world police development programs?" By answering these two secondary questions, the study worked to build a generic police development model

based in theory but informed by practical application that could serve to answer the primary research question and help guide America's support to Mali's police.

This study has built a generic police development model that combines SSR theory and lessons learned from SSR programs to identify police development activities that are best implemented to strengthen a foreign police organization. This model expands on more typical training and development programs by examining several different factors. It considers a country's overall security situation. It includes factors such as a police organization's basic capabilities to perform its mission of providing security and ensuring rule of law in terms of the organization's training and equipment. It accounts for the typically less glamorous aspects of organizational development and administrative processes that are vital to any well functioning organization. It also factors intangible issues such as political will to implement change, stability of funding sources, and long-term dedication by both the donor and receiving countries.

The police development model examines all of these issues and provides a framework to build a police development program that is aligned with international norms. The model begins by considering a country's overall security situation, evaluating a country's status on range from being a failed state to being developed country. This range provides a graduated scale that indicates the general type of police development activities that are needed. The model classifies those activities into the categories of Complete Security Sector Reform, Institutional Development, Equipment, and Training. A country's security situation generally corresponds to the categories of development that should be implemented. A developed country at the top of the scale may only need some training and possibly limited equipment support as it improves its capabilities. At the

other end of the spectrum, a failed state requires a complete Security Sector Reform program that will require building a police organization anew, conducting institutional development actions, and providing equipment and training. Many countries will likely fall somewhere in between these extremes and will require a combination of institutional development, equipment, and training. The key to this portion of the model is that it prioritizes the needed actions for the donor country. For example, a nation that is emerging from conflict will likely require significant institutional development actions, along with equipment and training support. If donor countries address the training and equipment needs at the expense of the institutional development issues, the police development effort risks failure since it does not solve the more significant issues with institutional development.

Lastly, the police development model bases all of these actions on necessary prerequisite conditions. For the host nation, these conditions consist of the host nation leadership's political will to change and its stated goals. For donor countries, these factors consist of the commitment to long-term support, dedicated and stable funding sources, and the ability to provide right personnel to support the host nation. If these conditions are not present, the entire program risks failure as the necessary changes may not be fully implemented within the host nation's police force.

By combining these factors, the police development model provides a framework to identify and prioritize key development actions that should be taken to improve a police organization, with the most important items being depicted lower in the pyramid. By working together, each country can assess the requirements, prioritize actions, and develop a roadmap to improve the host nation's police force.

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This study examined the actions and results of America's previous police training program in Mali. It then applied the Police Development Model to Mali and determined what development actions should be taken as proscribed by the model. In short, the previous U.S. training program for Malian police focused on providing training courses and limited equipment support that came with those courses to build Mali's anti-terrorism capabilities. While this program helped to enhance certain specialized capabilities, it did not address basic fundamental problems within the Malian police that impeded them from providing security and enforcing rule of law. When the Police Development Model was applied to Mali, it also identified the training and equipment shortcomings that the previous program had sought to resolve. The model also identified several fundamental issues that need to be resolved at an organizational level for the Malian police to succeed in their mission of providing security and rule of law. Furthermore, the model recommends certain actions that can be taken to help resolve those issues.

This study shows that the model is valid because it successfully identified the shortcomings in America's previous training program for the Malian police. Prior to the coup, the U.S. and the rest of the international community held Mali as an example of regional democracy. Recognizing the immaturity of Mali's anti-terrorism capabilities, America's training program for the Malian police centered on anti-terrorism training courses. However, the U.S. was focusing its efforts in the wrong areas. Mali's police have fundamental problems with basic discipline, core values, corruption, training, and equipment that prevent them from accomplishing their primary police responsibilities. The police development model successfully identified these issues and recommends possible actions to rectify the issues. Whereas America's previous training program

incorrectly assessed the capabilities of Mali's police and failed to address fundamental

problems within the organization, the police development model identified those issues

and prioritizes development actions to help resolve them. Instead of spending years and

millions of dollars providing training in skills that do not address key issues within the

Malian police, the police development model offers an approach to help Mali address key

issues within its police and helps the U.S. focus its time and money on more important

issues.

Since the model has been shown to be valid, the study can then answer the

primary research question of, "What approach should the U.S. take toward training the

Malian police?" As described in chapter 4, the police development model identifies

several areas that the U.S. should seek to address. As it plans to resume assistance to the

Malian police, the U.S. should fundamentally change its assistance program from what it

did prior to the coup. Rather than focusing on training specialized skills to counter

terrorism, the U.S. should work with the Malian government to identify needs and

strengthen capabilities that focus on strengthening the Malian police organization,

improving training in core policing functions, and addressing basic equipment shortfalls.

As previously noted, the Malian police face significant problems due to

corruption, general poor performance, and infighting between different police unions.

This indicates that the most pressing issues to address within the Malian police relate to

institutional development. For the Malian police to improve and develop into an

organization that performs to the standards of a democratic police force, it must change

its culture to espouse democratic policing values of rule of law and service to the

population. This will require strong leadership at the executive levels, but can also benefit

from donor country assistance. This can come in the form of assistance to strengthen the office of the Inspector General in order to counter corruption. It can come in the form of assistance to reform its management processes to improve strategic planning, budgeting, human resources, maintenance processes, community outreach, and auditing.

These actions help to improve the organization and address its problems in several ways. Improving these processes helps the organization efficiently manage itself and its operations. This in turn can lead to improved performance of the organization. Strengthening the internal processes and the office of the Inspector General makes corruption and graft more difficult to conceal and continue. Strengthening the office of the Inspector General helps to identify and take action possible cases of corruption. These actions can have further impact by raising morale of the officers and helping to regain the public's trust.

The model identifies the need for equipment support for the Malian police. However, rather than providing equipment to build advanced skillsets such as forensic analysis laboratories or equipment for advanced tactical capabilities, equipment support for the Malian police should initially focus on items to enable daily performance of core police functions. This includes equipment that officers need to respond to calls for assistance such as communications, basic personal protective equipment, and basic investigations equipment. Additionally, this could include patrol vehicles and maintenance support. Lastly, it may include facilities support to ensure that police precincts have adequate facilities and office supplies to conduct business.

The model identifies the need for training within the Malian police force. However, rather than training specialized or advanced skills, this training should focus on

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basic, core police functions. This should include an emphasis on training democratic policing principles that emphasize rule of law and service to the public. The training program should stress training in human rights, criminal law, police procedures and tactics, handling crime, use of force, and police values. Additionally, Mali's training program should not be limited to only the entry level. It should continue to develop officers as they advance to more senior levels within the organization or take on specialized roles and duties. Additionally, it should also include academic instruction as well as a period of field training under the tutelage of a more experienced officer. Because of this, training assistance to the Malian police may take the form of curriculum review to improve the initial training provided to Malian police as well as development of mid level and senior level in service training programs to further develop officers as they advance in their careers.

The police development model offers several benefits to organizations planning to provide police assistance to foreign countries. First and foremost, it helps to identify and prioritize capabilities that should be developed within a police organization. As noted in the case studies, assistance programs often default to simply providing training and equipment. These training and equipping programs are relatively simple to conduct. They are also easier to document and show progress as "X" amount of money is spent over "Y" amount of time to train "Z" number of police officers in a certain skill. The ability to measure these items to demonstrate progress also helps to understand the prevalence of train and equip programs. While training and equipment is important, it will likely fail if the organization does not have solid foundations in leadership, values, climate, and management. The model identifies and prioritizes institutional development issues in

order to focus on these more important, although less glamorous, activities rather than training advanced capabilities that the organization will not be able to sustain without proper institutional development.

The model also leads donor countries to better assess the organization that they are attempting to help. America's assistance to Malian police was based on an incomplete assessment of their situation and capabilities. This is partly because America's security interests in the region centered on terrorist threats, and partly because America did not fully appreciate the weaknesses of Mali's police institutions. Applying the police development model specifically addresses the organizational development level of the police force and forces a donor country to assess the organization in those terms.

In addition to the institutional development issues, the model compels an honest assessment of the potential sustainability and likelihood of success of a development program. The model takes into account the real world friction that can come as a result of change initiated by development programs. Programs that seek to reduce corruption will certainly face resistance and likely roadblocks from those who gain from corrupt practices. Programs that result from an outsider's assessment of the police will likely fail to gain the full support of host nation leadership if it does not match their goals for the organization or meet their stated needs. Programs may have a tremendous amount of forethought and may begin with early success only falter as funding is unexpectedly reduced. Programs may seek to provide assistance and mentoring to a police organization, but may not be able to identify advisors with the requisite knowledge in police procedure, management, or mentoring, as well as knowledge of local cultures or languages. The police development model helps to ensure success by identifying the

importance of these issues and honestly assessing them as prerequisite conditions to beginning any program.

Lastly, the model provides for the flexibility and can accommodate the difficulties and complexity inherent in police development programs. Development is not an easy or linear process, where input "A" leads to action "B" which yields result "C". Many different factors contribute to the success or failure of programs. Some aspects of a program may succeed while others may fail or simply take longer than anticipated (U.S. Agency for International Development 2011). As a police organization develops and moves to different levels within the model, the model still provides guidance as to what actions to take. As the Malian police improve their organizational issues to reduce corruption, regain the capability to provide basic policing and regain the public's confidence, the time may come when donor countries do not need to strengthen basic functions and can turn their focus to building specialized skills by providing training and equipment to counter terrorism. Conversely, if a country experiences setbacks, the model once again provides guidance about the necessary capabilities to address. In Mali's case prior to the coup, the international community believed that Malian police were more advanced along the model than they actually were and focused their training and equipment on advanced skills. Mali's recent history has highlighted problems within the Malian police that show it needs institutional development support. Once again, the model does not commit a donor or host nation to a lock-step process, but provides a flexible framework to identify and prioritize needed development actions.

Recommendations for Further Research

This study examined SSR theory and identified lessons learned from case studies of SSR programs in East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. This information was used to formulate a police development model, which was then validated and applied to Mali in order to identify a roadmap for further police development activities for the Malian police. Through the course of this study, the author has identified potential weakneses in the model that call for further research.

Two of the most significant SSR efforts in recent time have been the work done in Iraq and Afghanistan to completely rebuild the security sectors in those countries. As part of the SSR programs, the international community has done an incredible amount of work to rebuild the police organizations in each country. However, because the situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan was significantly different from that of Mali, the author did not include those two countries in the case studies that contributed to the police development model.

Through the course of the SSR efforts in each country, both Iraq and Afghanistan faced significant opposition from active insurgencies. The level of violence was significantly higher in each country and posed challenges to their respective SSR programs. The police in particular were affected in the type and amount of training that they received when compared to the training received by the police in East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone as the Iraqi and Afghani police focused on paramilitary skills in order to fight the insurgents. (Bayley and Perito 2010). Further research should be conducted to determine the police development model's validity in countries that do not require complete SSR development anew, but continue to face active and dangerous

insurgencies. The police development model focuses on building the police institutions and developing basic police capability to provide security and rule of law. Further research should examine how the need to immediately field a paramilitary police capability to provide security and fight an insurgency impacts the police development model.

As mentioned earlier, the police development model examines SSR theory and uses case studies from police development programs from a country in Asia, Europe, and Africa to formulate a police development model. These countries were picked because they offer a sample of common SSR issues throughout the world. Further research should examine how lessons learned differ between each region of the world. Are there issues common any specific region? Do Anglophone and Francophone Africa pose unique issues that are specific to each region within Africa?

Lastly, this study identified several prerequisite conditions that must be in place for SSR efforts to have a reasonable chance of succeeding. These included the host nation leadership's support, convergence of host nation goals, and donor country willingness to support over years with the appropriate funding levels and personnel. Further study should be undertaken to determine possible activities that can be taken in the absence of one or more of these conditions.

APPENDIX A

ATA Program Courses

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear – Hospital-Based Management of Mass Casualty Incidents
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear – Awareness
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear – Operations
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear – Refresher

Crisis Management
Critical Incident Management
Emergency Management Exercise Design
Hostage Negotiations

Cyber
Cyber Awareness for Prosecutors
Fundamentals of Network Security
Identification and Seizure of Digital Evidence
Identification and Seizure of Digital Evidence Train the Trainer
Introduction to Digital Forensics and Investigations
Proactive Internet Investigations Course

Explosives
Advanced Explosives Incident Countermeasures
Explosives Incident Countermeasures
Post Blast Investigations
Underwater Explosives Incident Countermeasures

Homeland Security
Airport Security Management
Border Control Management
Fraudulent Document Recognition
Quality Control in Civil Aviation Security

Investigative
Forensic Examination of Terrorist Crime Scenes
Interdicting Terrorist Activities
Interviewing Terrorist Suspects
Investigating Terrorist Incidents
Major Case Management

Maritime
Maritime Interdiction of Terrorism
Maritime Port and Harbor Security Management

Management
Combating Domestic and Transnational Terrorism
Identifying and Developing Investigative Information
Integrating Counterterrorism Strategies at the National Level
Investigating Information Management
Police Leader's Role in Combating Terrorism

Protection
Preventing Attacks on Soft Targets
Surveillance Detection
Very Important Person Protection
Very Important Person Protection Designated Defense Marksman
Very Important Person Protection Tactical Support Team
Vital Infrastructure Security

Tactical
Advanced Crisis Response Team
Crisis Response Team
Tactical Commander's Course
Tactical Management of Special Events

Training
Counterterrorism Components of Academy Development
Instructor Development Course

Source: U.S. Department of State OIG, Office of Audits Middle East Region Operations, Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs, Report Number AUD/MERO-12-20 April 2012.

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